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Abstract
The mind has not been a central concept in sociology. According to the traditional view, the mind is located in the brain, and is thus 
bereft of observable social facts for sociological studies. At most, it is a concept of psychology or philosophy. This article argues that 
the history of the modern novel provides large amounts of data about minds and consciousness. Even though individual novels are 
fictional and invented, the continual reception of these fictional presentations verifies their social relevance. The article argues that 
fiction establishes the main social discourse on possible private thoughts, thus having a great impact on how we understand and speak 
about minds and human interiority. The argument is advanced by selectively reading a long-standing narratological debate on literary 
minds and their exceptionality. The article renounces the cognitive theories of ‘mind-reading’ as overly optimistic and metaphorically 
misleading, resorting instead to the phenomenological theories of ‘primary intersubjectivity’, which help in understanding how 
novelists are able to invent credible minds in the first place. 
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La mente imposible de la sociología
Resumen
La mente no ha sido un concepto central en sociología. Según la visión tradicional, la mente se sitúa en el cerebro y por consigui-
ente está desprovista de hechos sociales observables para los estudios de sociología. Como mucho, es un concepto de psicología y 
filosofía. Este artículo argumenta que la historia de la novela moderna proporciona una gran cantidad de datos sobre las mentes y la 
conciencia. A pesar de que las novelas individuales sean ficción y estén inventadas, la recepción constante de estas presentaciones 
ficticias verifica su pertinencia social. El artículo argumenta que la ficción crea el discurso social principal sobre los pensamientos pri-
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vados posibles, por lo cual tiene una gran repercusión en cómo entendemos y hablamos de las mentes y de la interioridad humana. 
El argumento va más allá de la lectura selectiva de un debate narratológico antiguo sobre las mentes literarias y su excepcionalidad. 
El artículo renuncia a las teorías cognitivas de “lectura de la mente” por ser demasiado optimistas y por inducir metafóricamente al 
error. En cambio, recurre a las teorías fenomenológicas de “intersubjectividad primaria”, que, sobre todo, ayudan a entender cómo 
los novelistas son capaces de inventar mentes creíbles. 
Palabras clave
mente, novela, excepcionalidad, narratología, lectura de la mente, intersubjectividad primaria
For many reasons, the mind has seldom been profiled as a 
sociologically significant concept. The mind appears to belong 
to psychology or philosophy, and it is thus bereft of socially 
observable facts for sociologists to study. Most problematically, 
the mind tends to be located within the skull – i.e., in the brain 
– and thus beyond the reach of the sociological gaze. I hold a 
more expansive conception of the mind and argue that literary 
fiction – the novel and short story in particular – has provided 
a socially observable and historically attested discourse of the 
mind. The long history of reading fiction proves the validity of 
these fictional minds and transforms the general understanding 
of the potentialities of other minds among readers. My method 
in this article is to selectively re-read a recent debate on fictional 
minds and their exceptionality in literary theory by focusing on 
the historical conditions for the possibility of the emergence of 
exceptional and textually available third-person minds. I intend 
to tease out some relevant particularities of the fictional discourse 
on minds with the help of Ian McEwan’s novel The Children Act 
(2014).
At first sight, it may seem odd to turn to literary fiction and 
literary theorists when reflecting on issues concerning minds and 
consciousness. I want to emphasise that there is no need to 
assume that novelists in general are especially profound theorists 
of the mind or consciousness. What is obvious, however, and 
what I elaborate further below, is that many novelists have indeed 
engaged in nuanced games with various minds, often with minds 
in the business of trying to understand and communicate with 
other minds. To put it bluntly, I am less interested in the thoughts 
and ideas novelists display as such than I am in the special 
practices and operations that fiction enables, especially novels 
as discursive sites for playing with minds. From this perspective, 
fiction can be understood as a historically evolving practice of 
language use with particular linguistic and rhetorical affordances 
in portraying, elaborating, and analysing minds. As I will argue 
in this article, fiction is an exceptional site for experimenting 
with minds and mind attributions. I propose the use of these 
resources within fiction generates sociologically relevant facts, 
namely discursive presentations of other minds and their working 
in context. 
The distinctiveness of fiction
At least since the seminal work of Dorrit Cohn (1978; 1999), the 
issue of (re)presenting minds has been profiled as one of the most 
crucial distinctions between literary fiction and non-fiction. Cohn 
was an ambitious writer. The titles of her books Transparent minds: 
Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction (1978) 
and The Distinction of Fiction (1999) finely portray the particular 
relevance of fictional minds for the distinctiveness of the whole 
genre of narrative fiction. In brief, Cohn’s argument is that we 
are able to know the most intimate thoughts of fictional minds in 
ways that remain impossible with real-life minds. 
How can we justify such an exceptionality? According to 
Cohn and the narratological convention, fiction writers do not 
represent other minds; they present them: “In depicting the inner 
life, the novelist is truly a fabricator” (Cohn 1999, p. 6). The 
novelist is the creator of his or her characters, and because of 
this creation, the novelist is always able to describe even the 
deepest thought. “[A] character […] is known to his narrator in 
a manner no real person can be known to a real speaker” (Cohn 
1999, p. 117).
When Cohn (1999) discusses the ‘signposts’ of fictionality and 
the distinctiveness of fiction, it is essential to recognise the frame 
and direction of her polemic. Once and again, she accentuates the 
clear and pertinent distinction between fiction and historiography. 
This is also the case when Cohn (1999, p. 117) begins with a 
quote from the philosopher John Searle who suggests that “There 
is no textual property, syntactic or semantic, that will identify a 
text as a work of fiction”. Searle defended his bold claim with a 
reference to the beginning of Iris Murdock’s novel The Red and 
the Green. Cohn points out that this example effectively testifies 
against Searle’s own case, because “what ‘serious’ discourse ever 
quoted the thoughts of a person other than the speaker’s own?” 
As for history, Cohn’s claim is apposite and highly relevant, for 
example, in discriminating against the pan-fictional theories of 
Hayden White (1978; 1987). Following his formalist ideas, White 
famously argued that because the novel and historiography both 
rely on narrative form, they are, for this reason, intrinsically and 
equally fictional. Cohn reminds her readers of several other authors 
(e.g. E. L. Doctorow and Arnold Toynbee) who also reason that the 
category of ‘narrative’ as such eliminates the difference between 
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fiction and non-fiction. Within this debate, it is easy to affirm 
Cohn’s position, as she insists on the essential formal differences 
between different narrative genres. 
However, Cohn’s term ‘serious discourse’ engenders some 
further ambiguity. The expression is vague, rendering the argument 
seriously open and simultaneously highly normative, downplaying 
the relevance of all possible deviations. To contextualise the 
comment, it is useful to remember that prominent narrative 
theorists of the time such as Paul Ricoeur (1984; 2004), White, and 
Cohn all share one important and problematic point of departure 
in theorising narrative. They all focus on comparing history and 
literature as the dominant genres of narrative, largely disregarding 
the whole existence of everyday oral narration, as studied and 
theorised within the thriving sociolinguistic tradition of William 
Labov and Joshua Waletzky (1997).1 Does the suggested idea 
of non-serious narrative discourse refer to these oral versions? I 
return to the consequences of this problem later, but I will remark 
here that Mari Hatavara and Jarmila Mildorf (2017) have recently 
documented how narrators in vicarious storytelling indeed keep 
accounting for other people’s thoughts and mind contents (see 
also Browse and Hatavara, forthcoming). 
Cohn’s argument for the particularity of fiction in presenting 
third-person minds is powerful, yet possibly too categorical. If, as 
Käte Hamburger (1993, p. 83) points out and Cohn affirmatively 
states, “Epic fiction is the sole epistemological instance where the 
I-originarity (or subjectivity) of a third person qua third person can 
be portrayed”, and if the novelists ‘know’ the characters’ minds 
only because they have themselves created them, at least one 
confusing problem still remains. This argument does not include 
any elements that could help us to explain the birth and evolution 
of this aptitude to present elaborate and credible fictional minds. 
How, indeed, has this exceptional capacity emerged exclusively 
within fiction? 
This problem is in parallel with another issue often used in 
arguing for the exceptionality of fiction, namely the question of 
referentiality. If my argument is correct, in the following passage 
Cohn is still drawing a distinction between historiography and 
fiction, as she maintains, “The adjective nonreferential in the 
definitional phrase ‘nonreferential narrative’ needs to be qualified 
at somewhat greater length. First and foremost, it signifies “that 
a work of fiction itself creates the world to which it refers by 
referring to it” (Cohn 1999, p. 13, italics added). Historians 
are not allowed to create their own worlds without a point-by-
point reference to archival documents. This is not to say that 
everything in historiography is factual or that historians do not 
try to pursue their own agendas and tell their own versions of 
 1.   Monika Fludernik (1996) famously pioneered the use of oral stories and storytelling in ‘natural’ (cognitive) narratology, even giving them a fundamental role 
in understanding the nature of narrativity. David Herman (1999b) similarly suggests a particular socionarratology that combines the resources of narratology 
and the sociolinguistic study of narratives. 
the past. Nevertheless, historians cannot elaborate the contents 
of historical minds without clear, textual sources. Historians are 
indeed liable to explain that the past world they describe is not 
of their own making.
Of course, the problem of referentiality is not quite so 
straightforward, as Cohn herself is the first to admit with an 
example from Flaubert’s Sentimental Education. Novels are able 
to create double frames, Cohn argues, setting first a historical, 
factual, and referential frame, and then a fictional frame with 
fictional characters within it. After all, we can accept that Don 
DeLillo’s (2007) Falling Man refers to the real Manhattan and 
the events of 9/11. A similar problem arises with geography. 
For example, in McEwan’s (2014) The Children Act, the actual 
geography of London, together with the invented places, does 
not merely constitute a passive context for the events to happen; 
it plays an active role inside the fictional narration (Hyvärinen, 
2018). Gradually, the distinction between referential and non-
referential genres rather begins to resemble the difference between 
Weberian ideal types rather than an empirically valid distinction. 
The beginning of Hilary Mantel’s author note in A Place of Greater 
Safety provides a good example:
This is a novel about the French Revolution. Almost all the 
characters in it are real people and it is closely tied to historical 
facts – as far as those facts are agreed, which isn’t really 
very far. It is not an overview or a complete account of the 
Revolution. (Mantel 2010, p. ix)
In short, the difference between ‘referential’ and ‘non-referential’ 
seems to be a difference of degree, not of kind, at least for the 
novelists themselves. With minds, the problem of ‘the non-
referential’ cuts even deeper. Let me repeat Cohn’s (1999, p. 
13) prime example of non-referential fiction, taken from Franz 
Kafka’s The Castle:
It was late in the evening when K. arrived. The village was 
deep in snow. The Castle hill was hidden, veiled in mist and 
darkness, nor was there a glimmer of light to show that a 
castle was there. (Kafka, 1969, p. 3)
It is not difficult to observe that this opening passage and the 
whole novel is much more deeply non-referential than Hilary 
Mantel’s work. We may want to afford a particular aesthetic value 
to Kafka’s work just because of this profound non-referentiality 
– or perhaps not – but aesthetic evaluation is not my primary 
concern here. For a European reader, at least, such words as 
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‘village’, ‘castle’, ‘mist’, and ‘darkness’ already have a distinct 
referential value on a more generic, cultural level. We most likely 
do not understand castles as children’s playgrounds, but attach 
to them connotations of history, authority, privilege, and possibly 
detention. As much as the characters, events, and thoughts are 
invented and onerically non-referential, the novel powerfully 
builds on what can be called generic cultural referentiality. 
The novel is not ‘about’ a particular event, like Mantel’s novel; 
nevertheless, it is ‘about’ something culturally recognisable. As 
much as the level of events and characters is non-referential 
and invented, the cultural level of darkness is referred to and 
vividly evoked. David Herman (2002, p. 101) experiments with 
the absolute limits of narrativity, giving at the same time good 
examples of texts utterly devoid of referentiality, such as “A 
sluppa fiblo. Sim a gingy beeble the yuck I the splubba orbia”. If 
everything in fiction were invented and non-referential, most of 
us would not be keen on reading novels, since they would not 
speak or matter to us in any significant way. 
In a recent, much debated contribution to the problem of 
fictionality, Henrik Skov Nielsen, James Phelan, and Richard Walsh 
(2015, p. 62) similarly emphasise that “the use of fictionality is not 
a turning away from the actual world but a specific communicative 
strategy within some context in that world”. However, soon 
afterwards they instead maintain that the “ability to invent, 
imagine, and communicate without claiming to refer to the 
actual is a fundamental cognitive skill, one crucial to humans’ 
interactions with their world and their fellow beings in that world” 
(Skov Nielsen, Phelan and Walsh 2015, p. 63, italics added). 
According to my argument, this categorical, unequivocal rejection 
of referentiality is a poor and ambiguous criterion for fictionality. 
To escape this confusing wavering – to turn or not to turn away 
from the actual world – I suggest a new distinction between 
event-historical referentiality and broader cultural referentiality. 
Fiction too refers to the actual world, but its methods of reference 
are different, more complex, and indirect compared to those of 
non-fiction.
The idea of there being two different kinds of referentiality 
becomes more salient when we return specifically to minds. The 
standard, categorical claim that the novelists do not ‘represent’ the 
characters’ minds because they fictionally ‘create’ them becomes 
somewhat problematic when we introduce this notion. Readers 
already know – at least distantly – castles, villages, and darkness, 
but according to Cohn’s own theory, no such knowledge of other 
minds exists outside fiction. If other people really are such black 
boxes whose minds are utterly inaccessible to us, we run into 
two problems. Firstly, from where do the novelists draw their 
 2.  Cognitive narratology is a much wider and richer project than is possible to cover here. Monika Fludernik (1996), David Herman (2002; 2003; 2009; 2011), 
Manfred Jahn (2005), and Bernaerts et al. (2013) are just a few influential texts within this approach. Patrick Colm Hogan (2003, p. 240), for example, does 
not share the ideas of mind-reading and emphasises instead “We do not have access to anyone’s experiential subjectivity. We cannot feel anyone else’s 
emotions. Thus, to identify their emotions, we must rely on the clues from what can experience. Prototypes are extremely helpful in this regard”.
credible insights about minds? Secondly, if the imagined fictional 
minds are entirely non-referential, residing outside the cultural 
layer of referentiality, how can we explain the readers’ interest in 
encountering these minds and finally even understanding these 
entirely invented entities?
Mind-reading as a solution?
Around the turn of the millennium, literary narratology experienced 
a significant theoretical rejuvenation and boom in new theories 
(Fludernik, 2005). This major change of agendas, methods, 
and theories was quickly characterised as a move from classical 
(structuralist, formalist) narratology to postclassical (cognitive, 
rhetorical, unnatural) narratology (Herman 1999a; Alber and 
Fludernik 2010). “Cognitive narratology can be defined as the 
study of mind-relevant aspects of storytelling practices” and as 
“a subdomain within ‘postclassical’ narratology” (Herman, 2009, 
p. 3). The approach draws heavily on cognitive science, cognitive 
psychology, and the neurosciences; it applies their theories and 
concepts in the analysis of fiction, often with the mission of making 
literary scholarship more scientific.
Some representatives of cognitive narratology2 – most 
prominently Lisa Zunshine (2006) and Alan Palmer (2004; 
2010) – radically contest Cohn’s basic assumptions about the 
accessibility of everyday minds. At the same time, the whole 
frame of discussion in narratology changes, since cognitive 
narratologists are not primarily interested in drawing a line 
between history and fiction. Rather, they focus on elaborating the 
continuities between fiction and everyday experience. The title of 
Lisa Zunshine’s (2006) influential book, Why We Read Fiction: 
Theory of Mind and the Novel, summarises the crucial argument. 
Theory of Mind (ToM), which was developed within cognitive 
science, is a central element both in Zunshine’s and Palmer’s 
theories of fiction. While Cohn argued for the distinctiveness 
of fiction and narratology as a distinct theory about fiction, 
cognitive narratologists often celebrate the achievements of 
cognitive science and cognitive psychology as general theories 
for building narratology and fiction studies. David Herman (2001, 
p. 2) outlines this new hierarchy of disciplines by suggesting 
“both narrative theory and linguistics should […] be construed 
as resources for cognitive science”. In his later work, Herman 
(2011a) rejects this hierarchy, but Alan Palmer (2011, p. 200), 
for example, endorses the position with a far more radical 
formulation (see below).
The impossible mind of sociologyhttp://digithum.uoc.edu
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Universidad de Antioquia
Digithum, No. 24 (July 2019) | ISSN 1575-2275  A scientific e-journal coedited by UOC and UdeA
40
Matti Hyvärinen, 2019
FUOC, 2019
A RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CULTURE  
AND SOCIETY
Zunshine uses the terms ‘mind-reading’ and ‘Theory of Mind’ 
almost synonymously. She employs the latter concept “to describe 
our ability to explain people’s behaviour in terms of their thoughts, 
feelings, beliefs, and desires” (Zunshine 2006, p. 6). This is indeed 
vital mental vocabulary in accounting for human action, but her 
description of ToM nevertheless contains at least two pertinent 
shortcomings. Zunshine does not properly define or explicate the 
methods and resources for obtaining adequate input information 
about other minds, which, problematically enough, she seems to 
explain in terms of the parallel concept, ‘mind-reading’. However, 
the command of mental vocabulary does not say much about 
the problematic capability of detecting thoughts. In fiction, the 
behaviour of the characters can of course be explained in terms 
of “their thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and desires”, because the 
author ‘knows’ the characters in a way we seldom know people in 
real life. Furthermore, we can presume that Zunshine merely uses 
the term ‘mind-reading’ as a broad metaphor, yet this metaphor 
promises unspecified access to other minds and effectively effaces 
the crucial difference between reading fiction and observing real-
life people from afar. Do we indeed understand others in real life 
by being familiar with the intimate contents of their thought, as 
the metaphor suggests?
As the philosopher Daniel D. Hutto highlights, the word 
‘theory’ in ToM promises too much and gravely misrepresents 
the ways we understand others. Understanding and competently 
using the vocabulary of intentions is far from using a theory, at 
least a theory providing us with cogent information about other 
peoples’ mind contents. Knowing the ambiguity and volatility 
of feelings, desires, and beliefs, the computational machine 
needed for making sensible conclusions should be enormous and 
amazingly quick at the same time (on this criticism of ToM, see 
Hutto, 2004; 2007; 2008; 2009). In describing the acquisition of 
ToM by young children, Zunshine (2006, p. 8) recounts the often 
reported ‘false belief test’:
In one of the more widespread versions of the test, children 
see that ‘Sally’ puts a marble in one place and then exits the 
room. In her absence, ‘Anne’ comes in, puts the marble in a 
different place, and leaves. Children are then asked, “Where 
will Sally look for her marble when she returns?” 
Small children think that Sally will look for the marble in the place 
Anne has put it, not understanding that Sally does not know that 
Anne has changed the hiding place. The test obviously documents 
one important stage in human cognitive development. Yet it says 
preciously little about having a command of any finer set of mental 
concepts, or about how children understand complex reasons, 
desires, and beliefs. Understanding that people sometimes have 
false beliefs is some way away from knowing that in this particular 
situation and issue, this particular person may have an entirely 
false belief. A vast storage of cultural knowledge, rather than a 
mere psychological device, is needed to understand the complex 
networks of false beliefs. 
The fundamental problem with the test is that it frames the 
folk psychological understanding of minds in terms of a ‘spectator 
sport’, as Hutto (2004) puts it. In real-life situations, we do not 
sit behind a glass window and try to ‘read’ other unknown minds 
from afar. Infamously, paranoia relies on a tendency to “read” 
and misunderstand minds from afar even without interaction 
(Hyvärinen, 2015). If the understanding of other minds was based 
on such an abstract and general cognitive device that gave us 
broad access to ‘read’ other minds, there would not be much left 
of the particularity of fiction that Cohn theorised. 
Neither Zunshine nor any other cognitivist theorist claims that 
ToM provides limitless or unerring access to other minds. On the 
contrary, Zunshine (2004, p. 13) openly admits that “the process 
of attributing thoughts, beliefs, and desires to other people may 
lead to misinterpreting those thoughts, beliefs and desires”. 
However, cognitive narratologists have remarkably little to say 
about why ToM and mind-reading fail or succeed in particular 
situations, which renders the idea of mind-reading rather 
pointless in empirical analysis. This instability of interpretation, 
Zunshine argues, may, however, be one of the reasons why we 
read fiction:
It is possible, then, that certain cultural artefacts, such as 
novels, test the functioning of our cognitive adaptations for 
mind-reading while keeping us pleasantly aware that the ‘test’ 
is proceeding quite smoothly. (Zunshine 2004, 18, p. italics 
added)
Playing with different minds and tracking down the thinking 
and feeling of diverse minds in novels may indeed be one 
of the literary games that fascinate readers, yet Zunshine’s 
formulation threatens to reduce the entire complex literary 
experience to an instrumental exercise in the service of the 
evolutionary skills of mind-reading. Here, Zunshine rejects the 
exceptionality of fiction proposed by Cohn and postulates it as a 
mere auxiliary of real-life mind-reading. Nevertheless, Zunshine 
succeeds perfectly in documenting and elaborating the readers’ 
fascination with the most varied fictional minds. Perhaps we 
could now re-formulate her title to ask why we read fictional 
minds. The answer, I suggest, should include both everyday 
attempts at understanding other people and Cohn’s claim about 
the particularity of fictional minds. 
The critics of mind-reading
Cognitive narratology was designed to render literary studies 
more rigorous and scientific. For a sociologist like myself, a 
striking feature of its notions of mind and mind-reading is the 
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complete absence of social and interactional aspects. It assumes 
that people have simply become capable of reading other minds 
thanks to evolution and cognitive development. Dan Hutto and 
Shaun Gallagher (2007; 2009) in particular discredit this model. 
Gallagher points out that even small children are able to follow 
and understand the intentional, emotional states of adults. This 
understanding is embodied and immediate, and it is surely not 
mediated by any theory apparatus running in the child’s mind. 
Gallagher (2009, p. 293) also notes that infants ‘are not taking 
an observational stance; they are interacting with others. For 
example, infants vocalise and gesture in ways that are affectively 
and temporarily ‘tuned’ to the vocalisations and gestures of 
the other person’. Gallagher calls this phenomenon “primary 
intersubjectivity” and reminds us that it “is not something 
that we leave behind as we mature. We continue to rely on 
our perceptual access to the other’s affective expressions, the 
intonation of her voice, the posture and style of movement 
involved in her action”. This understanding is not based on 
abstract theory; it can accumulate with the help of intersubjective 
experience, and it has nothing to do with ‘reading’ other people’s 
thought contents. 
Based on such observations, Gallagher rejects what he calls 
“the Cartesian idea that other minds are hidden away and 
inaccessible”, and suggests instead that “we directly perceive 
the other person’s intentions, emotions, and dispositions in 
their embodied behaviour” (2009, p. 292). Gallagher steps 
determinedly out of the conceptual scheme of mind-reading by 
accentuating that our “normal, everyday stance toward the other 
person is not third-person, detached observation; it is second-
person interaction”. Gallagher’s ‘primary intersubjectivity’ thus 
transfers the issue of the mind to an intersubjective level. As 
regards literary minds, it helps to understand how novelists are 
able to invent credible minds without claiming that we could read 
some textual mind contents in third-person relationships in the 
way we read them in novels. Gallagher’s primary intersubjectivity 
is a strictly defined, limited phenomenon without a hint of 
accessing other people’s conceptual thought contents, as mind-
reading keeps doing.
Cognitivists typically call the command of ToM “folk 
psychology”. In such use, the term is rather confusing because 
there is normally not much ‘folk’ in cognitivist theories, since 
they build on intrapsychic capacities. Hutto instead draws on 
Jerome Bruner’s entirely different idea of folk psychology. Bruner, 
a disenchanted former cognitive psychologist himself and a 
pioneer of Vygotskyan cultural psychology, locates the issues 
of folk psychology and understanding others at the social level 
(Bruner, 1990; Amsterdam and Bruner, 2000). “Folk psychology 
[…] is a culture’s account of what makes human beings tick”, he 
argues (Bruner 1990, p. 13). Bruner’s folk psychology is based on 
the cultural knowledge of canonicity, on cultural and normative 
expectations about how things should be and come about within 
a particular culture (1990, p. 39–40). 
For Bruner, folk psychology is far from a deep psychological 
gaze into other minds and thoughts. Instead, it denotes our local 
cultural knowledge resources. Most of the time, we understand 
what other people do and can do because we understand the 
cultural canonicities, frames, and scripts. Of course, the exceptional 
moments and deviations from expectations are critical moments 
in understanding the minds of others. ToM theorists suggest that 
in cases of such deviations, people start their ToM devices in 
order to make sense of the thinking of others. However, Bruner 
also frames this situation in social terms. He maintains that “it is 
only when constituent beliefs in a folk psychology are violated 
that narratives are constructed” (Bruner 1990, p. 39). Where 
ToM theorists see atomistic individuals running a theory, Bruner 
looks at the social situation and sees the participants’ need to 
give and order narrative accounts of deviant behaviour. Hutto 
(2008, p. 46) argues that asking “why did you do it this way?” 
or any other version of a “why” question in interaction is a much 
more powerful and reliable method than immersing oneself in 
speculative mind-reading. 
Gallagher and Hutto do not entirely refute the existence of 
the processes described in terms of ToM, but they argue that 
those processes are rather marginal and sporadic. On the one 
hand, understanding others is fairly immediate, interactional, and 
embodied rather than being theory-driven. On the other hand, it 
is based on a command of cultural knowledge and an achieved 
familiarity with the people to be understood. When I have a light 
conversation on domestic issues with my wife, I often know her 
responses in advance, even down to the words she will choose. 
Following Gallagher, the insight is immediate and based on a 
history of an interactionally shared field of humour. However, 
without shared prompts or ongoing conversation, I cannot claim 
any capacity to know the contents of her thought. Gallagher 
and Hutto therefore help us to understand the successes and 
failures in understanding other minds, because they outline 
the crucial resources for understanding others more concretely 
when compared to the ToM theorists. As they argue, the growth 
of understanding is built on interaction, both on telling folk 
psychological explanatory narratives and on asking the decisive 
‘why’ questions when expectations have been breached. A 
lack of familiarity, inadequate cultural resources, and missing 
interactions tend to generate misunderstanding and speculative 
mind-reading.
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Alan Palmer and the extended mind
The literary theorist Alan Palmer (2004, 2010) defends a markedly 
externalist view on fictional and real-life minds.3 He does so by 
often taking a somewhat radical cognitivist position. When Cohn 
(1978) wrote of fiction’s ‘transparent minds’, another literary 
theorist, Ann Banfield (1982, 211), aptly criticised the choice of 
terms by saying that represented consciousness “does not create 
‘transparent minds’. The mind is never transparent, not even to 
‘omniscient narrators’”. In Fictional Minds, Palmer (2004, p. 132) 
initially takes an entirely different position: 
I wish to argue here that not only can fictional minds be 
transparent to readers, there is a strong sense in which real 
minds can be transparent to other people. Daniel Dennett 
makes the point that your ‘body can vigorously betray the 
secrets you are desperately trying to keep… 
‘Transparent’ is arguably not the most apposite term to characterise 
minds. People would not make the amount of wrong choices they 
do if they had a transparent vision of their own and other people’s 
minds. The problem with perceiving minds is partly due to their 
volatile and inexhaustible nature. Quite correctly, Palmer notes 
that in fiction other people often better recognise the thoughts 
of a character than the character does him- or herself. Such 
situations would of course be impossible in real life if we truly 
had a transparent view of our own minds. Language can never 
exhaustively communicate real-life experiences (e.g. Brockmeier, 
2008). In the case of fiction, there is of course only the words on 
the page, but rather than providing clear-cut and transparently 
dull minds, artful fiction alludes to the same inexhaustible nature 
of minds with all its layers, niches, and allusions. Six years later, 
in Social Minds in the Novel, Palmer’s (2010, p. 44) terminology 
and position has changed accordingly: 
An emphasis on social minds will inevitably question these 
twin assumptions: first, that the workings of our own minds 
are never accessible to others; and, second, that the workings 
of our own minds are always and unproblematically accessible 
to ourselves. 
While transparency is primarily a categorical yes-or-no quality, 
accessibility affords more flexibility and space for negotiation. 
The contents of a real-life mind are to some extent accessible, but 
 3.  Palmer introduces a remarkable amount of new discussions outside literary theory; a contribution I cannot cover fully in this article. In discussing the extended 
mind, Palmer (2010, p. 51) also introduces such authors as Andy Clark, who “are also interested in another aspect of the mind that is called physically 
distributed cognition: ‘our habit of off-loading as much as possible of our cognitive tasks into the environment itself’” (Dennett 1996). Andy Clark calls this 
process “Supersizing the Mind” (2009).
 4.  Scholars may appear to write their academic work in solitude, but they are constantly in discussion with other scholars through their contributions.
this is not the same thing as claiming that somebody has actually 
accessed them, or, for that matter, that minds are accessible in 
every last detail. Palmer correctly notes that even in fiction, there 
are minds that resist the reader’s attempts to access them. 
Palmer emphatically promotes the concept of the social mind 
to depict “those aspects of the whole mind that are revealed 
through the externalist perspectives” (Palmer, 2010, p. 39). 
Next, he proceeds to outline his most original contribution: “An 
important part of the social mind is our capacity for intermental 
thought. Such thinking is joint, group, shared, or collective, as 
opposed to intramental, or individual or private thought” (Palmer, 
2010, p. 41, italics in the original). According to Palmer, literary 
scholars have so far focused too one-sidedly on characters’ 
thinking in solitude and have passed over the workings of the 
mind during action and interaction. Who is indeed living his or her 
life by listening to inner monologues? Palmer (2010, p. 42) asks 
“Why assume that the self can only be found (or easily found) 
in solitude?”4 The mind beyond the skin should replace the old, 
limited ToM within the skull. Minds should not be automatically 
located ‘between the ears’, as it is frequently put. Therefore, minds 
should not escape the sociological gaze either.
To refine his theory, Palmer (2010, p. 46–48) proposes a 
typology of social minds in novels, thereby introducing a whole set 
of sociological perspectives to fiction. He suggests the categories 
of intermental encounters: small intermental units (e.g. families), 
medium-sized intermental units (e.g. colleagues, neighbours), 
large intermental units (towns and villages), and intermental 
minds (tightly consolidated units of any size). For a sociologist, 
this categorisation offers mind-related phenomena at several 
levels of social organisation, even though it appears in current 
form somewhat ad hoc and devoid of a systematic theoretical 
grounding. 
Palmer (2010, p. 46) explains “intermental encounters” by 
saying that it “is not possible to have a coherent dialogue without 
at least some intermental communication”. The psycholinguist 
Stephen C. Levinson (2006, p. 45) similarly argues that “the 
interpretation of others” behaviour is a precondition for 
interaction’, and suggests thus that humans have an “interaction 
engine” before actual interaction. The metaphor is typically 
cognitive, and refers to phenomena that Gallagher discussed in 
terms of “primary intersubjectivity” and adaptive intentionality. 
By “small intermental units”, Palmer refers to “small groups 
of various sorts such as marriages, close friendships, and nuclear 
families” (2010, p. 47). Here, the participants typically have lots 
of experiential knowledge of how the others behave, think, and 
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express themselves. Without entering into any sort of mind-
reading, couples, for example, may also have a huge store of 
local canonicity, an understanding of how things normally are. 
In McEwan’s The Children Act, the protagonist – Fiona Maye – 
phones Jack, her husband, while on a business trip. She shows 
how well she is able to read the signs because of the familiarity 
of the setting:
When she heard his tentative hello, the acoustic told her 
that he was in the kitchen. The radio was playing, Poulenc 
perhaps. On Saturday mornings they always had, always used 
to have, a lazy but early breakfast, a spread of papers, muted 
Radio Three, coffee, warmed pain aux raisins from Lamb’s 
Conduit Street. He would be in his paisley silk dressing gown. 
Unshaven, hair uncombed. (McEwan, 2014, p. 181)
Before Jack says anything more than hello, Fiona has located 
him within the kitchen and their Saturday morning routine. She 
has done all this without any indication of reading Jack’s mind. 
It is also noteworthy that various material elements (e.g. the 
acoustics, the radio, and warmed pain aux raisins) participate 
in this emerging thinking beyond the skin. The correction of the 
expression (“they always had, always used to have” – the couple 
are experiencing marital difficulties) indicates that Fiona is indeed 
doing the thinking here. 
By “medium-sized intermental units”, Palmer refers to 
units “such as work colleagues, networks of friendships, and 
neighbourhoods”. What is different from the second category, 
Palmer explains, is that now ‘the emphasis is less on individuals 
knowing what another person is thinking and more on people 
thinking the same way’ (Palmer, 2010, p. 48). More precisely, we 
are talking about shared cultural knowledge the actors are able 
to mobilise in different situations. In order to elaborate what this 
could mean, I return to The Children Act, just before the passage 
quoted above. By mistake, possibly because of her confused 
motivations, Fiona – a judge – ends up kissing an 18-year-old 
boy, the subject of a law case over which she presided. The next 
day, while sitting in a car with Paulig, her assistant, Fiona ponders:
She was not prone to wild impulses and she didn’t understand 
her own behaviour. She realised there was much more to 
confront in her confused mix of feelings, but for now it was 
the horror of what might have come about, the ludicrous and 
shameful transgression of professional ethics, that occupied 
her. (McEwan, 2014, p. 180)
This short passage aptly summarises several themes discussed 
previously. We see, for instance, that Fiona’s mind was anything 
but transparent to herself or to the reader. Sitting in the same car, 
Paulig is possibly able to notice Fiona’s anxiety, but there are no 
available ways he could ‘read’ Fiona’s thoughts since the kiss never 
became public. Without experiential knowledge and interaction, 
the idea of mind-reading falls short in terms of understanding 
the contents of thought. The abstract theory of mind-reading 
can only notice that “Oh, it seems that Paulig fails in his mind-
reading”. In precisely the way Palmer suggests, Fiona makes her 
profession and its collective thinking relevant in her inner mind 
by thinking about her “ludicrous and shameful transgression of 
professional ethics”, thus inviting the disapproving tone of the 
assumed collective response. In a manner of speaking, she is not 
thinking alone, “within her skull”; she has activated the voice of 
the judgmental, professional chorus as part of her worrying. A 
few lines below, Fiona’s mental torture continues:
Even now, miles behind her in London, the case was being 
discussed. That one day soon she’d hear on her phone the 
hesitant embarrassed voice of a senior colleague. Ah, Fiona, 
look, awfully sorry but I’m afraid I should warn you, uh, 
something’s come up. Then, waiting for her back at Gray’s 
Inn, a formal letter from the Judicial Complaints investigation 
officer. (McEwan, 2014, p. 181)
Here again, only the readers are able to read these thoughts. 
Fiona’s shame is expressed in the typical form of hypothetical 
narration; she pre-figures her colleagues’ reprehension in her mind 
(Karttunen, 2015). Because of her experience and familiarity with 
the professional ethics and manners of her colleagues, Fiona is 
able to envision in a detailed, fictionalised way the prospective 
embarrassment and words of her colleagues. She knows the rules, 
the ethics, the manners, and the canonical course of events. In 
the novel, the judges recurrently disagree on the decisions made 
by other judges, yet this collectively shared and institutionalised 
layer of professional culture actively participates in Fiona’s thought. 
In her imagination, Fiona is able to read the public, canonical 
mind of the profession precisely because it consists of public and 
shared knowledge. However, there is no big juridical mind doing 
this thinking, since Fiona herself thinks and evokes the canonical 
expectations of her profession. Seen from another angle, Fiona is 
not only thinking individually; she also animates the shared thoughts 
of her profession. When Fiona arrives at the idea of the official 
letter waiting for her at Gray’s Inn, she finishes her dark thoughts, 
takes her phone and calls Jack. Together with the imagined official 
document and her phone, Fiona crosses the boundaries. Passing 
from the cultural and the canonical level, she returns to her home 
and the sphere of intensive interaction (however difficult due to 
her crises). These passages challenge the ideas of the transparency 
of minds and the unqualified capacity of mind-reading. They 
also register the wider social resources of understanding minds. 
In his discussion, Palmer succeeds in convincing how minds 
and mind processes are not confined within the skull or inside 
individual brains. His linguistic strategy of choice, of naming 
‘minds’ of different levels of social organisation nevertheless 
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evokes questions. The idea of various minds as nouns runs the 
risk of encouraging ideas about such minds being self-enclosed, 
stable, and semi-organic entities. The issue of the mind’s sociality 
might equally be addressed in terms of networks of meaning 
making, thus focusing on the social and spatial distribution of 
thinking, remembering, and feeling, without establishing new 
layers of collective organs. 
Palmer’s cognitive reductionism may further establish problems 
for his attempt to theorise the mind’s social aspects. Not only 
does he draw on resources and results from cognitive science; 
he makes them the essential basis of his theory: “To talk of a 
cognitive approach to literature can be rather misleading if it gives 
the impression that it is simply one alternative among a range of 
others… the cognitive approach is the basis of all the others” 
(Palmer 2011, p. 200). His view on fiction similarly threatens to 
remain narrowly reductionist, as he claims, “Fictional narrative 
is, in essence, the presentation of mental functioning” (2011, 
p. 202, italics added). These formulations, alas, render the bulk 
of the resources of social sciences and literary theory marginal. 
Palmer’s attempt to understand and thematise the mind beyond 
the skin is refreshing and welcome, yet the goal is hard to realise 
without renouncing the cognitive reductionism that eventually 
keeps privileging the processes within the skull. As one of the 
leading cognitivist theorists puts it, “Despite Palmer’s assertion, 
cognitive science offers no help here. If we follow the standard 
neuro-cognitive view that the mind is a function of the brain, 
then there has to be a brain for there to be a thought” (Colm 
Hogan, 2011, p. 244). 
The social relevance of fictional minds
The core sociological relevance of fictional minds does not primarily 
ensue from the representational truthfulness of these minds. As 
the literary theorist Maria Mäkelä (forthcoming) states, ‘writing 
generates interiority, and not vice versa’. Arguably, there is traffic 
in both directions, but my interest in this paper is in the way 
literary genres generate nuanced discursive tools for discussing the 
working of minds. There is no other institutional form of discourse 
that could present and study human emotions, thoughts, bodily 
sensations, talk, and behaviour as a holistic process. Patrick Colm 
Hogan (2003, p. 1) aptly remarks that when “empirical researchers 
in the social sciences consider the nature of emotions and emotion 
concepts […] with only a few exceptions, they almost entirely 
ignore a vast body of existing data that bears directly on feelings 
and ideas of feelings – literature, especially literary narrative”. 
The existence of this established institution and its experiments 
indicates that the understanding of what is “empirical” badly 
needs rethinking in sociology. 
By rephrasing the words of Marina Grishakova (2014, p. 
7), “fictional narratives work as experiential labs where various 
hypotheses and inferences about the functioning of the [mind] are 
imaginatively tested”. The history of the novel is accordingly partly 
about teasing out and communicating aspects of the human mind. 
“However, fictional narratives reach consequences not through 
the austere logic of argumentation, but by throwing in and 
elaborating on supervening details, displaying new circumstances 
and alternative paths” (Grishakova 2013, p. 7). In experimenting 
with connections between the body, emotion, thought, talk, and 
behaviour, fiction is significantly a theoretical project that should 
not be bypassed by considering it merely from the perspective of 
lacking referentiality. 
This is all sociologically relevant, since there is no alternative 
discursive field in which to experiment so systematically with 
possible private thoughts and processes. First the epistolary novel 
and then the modern novel not only expressed the feelings and 
thoughts of their protagonists; they effectively generated the 
language, metaphors, and discourses to express and refine human 
interiority. Due to the continuing reception of these fictional works 
and their role in education and even modern nation-building 
(Moretti, 1998), we have reasons to re-evaluate their sociological 
relevance. 
Different accounts about the history of the novel and the 
mind seem to verify one general observation. There is no linear 
history of minds in novels, and there is a lot of contingency in 
the ways of attributing the contents and processes of the mind 
to characters (see the contributions in Herman, 2011a). Such 
particularities include the relevance of the landscape, weather, 
and physical environment in the Romantic era (Vallins, 2011), 
as well as the mid-nineteenth-century exploration of human 
physiology as an indicator of the mind (Dames, 2011). Novelists 
do not simply approach people, ‘read their minds’, and write about 
their thoughts; they have flourishing literary genres with related 
affordances and all the non-literary, popular, and scholarly debates 
to draw on. For example, Anna Burns’ Milkman – a recent winner 
of the Booker Prize – quite obviously draws on Alan Palmer’s 
work. Terms like ‘mind-reading’ and ‘group minds’ abound in 
the novel with lots of ‘they’ narration and passive forms, not to 
mention a scarcity of any proper names in expressing collectively 
shared thought. 
The establishment and solidity of the genre seems to 
indicate some potentially contradictory observations about real 
and fictional minds. Above all, the way readers have received, 
accepted, and selected novels is a powerful argument for the 
real-life relevance of discursively presented fictional minds. There 
are elements of generic reference (“some people I know surely 
think just like that”), points of identification (“I feel the same, even 
though I couldn’t find the words for it”), and subject positioning 
(“Wow, I want to feel this way as well”). Within this circle of 
imagined narrative minds, readers arguably neglect the irrelevant 
proposals and, at the same time, adapt new ways of thinking, 
feeling, and experiencing. At the other end of the spectrum, 
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the existence of the growing literary genre enables the most 
writerly and ‘unnatural’ fictional minds. The circle of writing and 
reading fictional minds therefore does not indicate the reign of 
any traditional realism or straightforward referentiality; rather, it 
relies on sufficient recognition, invention, and co-construction. 
At the end of the story, ordinary people have a relatively shared 
understanding that other people have minds and mental interiority. 
I have argued in this article that the categorical conception of 
the non-referentiality of fiction needs to be revised and replaced by 
a more nuanced conception of the cultural and social referentiality 
of fiction. This is highly relevant from the perspective of sociology 
as well, since the idea of non-referentiality unnecessarily sets 
fiction apart from social reality. By understanding fiction as 
an experimental lab, but without reducing its complexities, 
fiction can be understood as a profound theoretical project that 
sheds light on such concepts as identity, intersectionality, social 
positioning, and the mind, to mention just a few of the most 
obvious candidates.
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